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In the Sttpreltle Cottt•t of the
State of Utah

MARCELLA JENSEN TUTrLE; and
RICHARD DALE TUTTLE, a minor,
by his Guardian ad litem, Marcella
Jensen Tuttle,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

NO. 7619

PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EXPRESS COMPANY, a corporation,
and HEATH H. CORNETTE,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
The "Statement of Facts" set out in appellants' brief,
and particularly that portion purporting to describe how
the collision in question happened, is so distorted that we
feel impelled to make a new statement, showing in detail
what the evidence established. Counsel for defendants and
appellants, far from fairly summarizing the evidence,. or
recognizing the evidence supporting the verdict of the jury,
have simply mentioned carefully selected extracts of that
part of the testimony which they believe supports their the-
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ory, a theory rejected by the jury. Beyond that, they
have stated as a fact their naked conclusions that the collision occurred as their theory suggested.
They seem not to recognize that they are not supporting the verdict of a jury in their favor, in which case there
might be some justification in merely reciting the facts and
conclusions favorable to them. They are endeavoring to
upset the verdict of a jury squarely against them. They
should not attempt to do this by ~closing their eyes to the
record in support of the jury's verdict.
I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The record establishes that· Dale Tuttle was a young
man of splendid habits. At the time of his death he was
twenty-one years of age (Tr.173). After being discharged
from the Navy, he married the plaintiff, Marcella J~sen
Tuttle, whom he had known in junior high school before
the war (Tr. 84). He had a- good job and steady income
which he devoted to family purposes (Tr. 186). At the
time of his death, his wife was about four months pregnant
(Tr. 187). The baby was born before the time of the trial
-a boy, in the custody of, and supported by, Marcella (Tr.
187).
On t~e evening of January 15th, 1949, Dale Tuttle,
who had haq supper with his wife and her folks in Springville, left home ·at 8:30 p.m. for the purpose of going to
Provo· to take part in a bowling match. The time he left
is fixed positively by various witnesses, and there was no
evidence adduced to the contrary (Tr. 145, 154, 177, 183,
189). .From the deceased's. home to the point of the col·
lision is 3. 7 miles (Tr. 159). The night was cold; and the
roads were exceedingly slick (Tr. 111, 164, 242, 395). It

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

was during the \Vorst part of the most severe winter experienced in this section for many years-the winter of
1948-1949.
The collision happened just 5 or 6 minutes after Dale
Tuttle left his home in Springville, bound for Provo to the
north, being at 8:35 or 8:36 p,m. (Tr. 325-326). The speed
recorder in the P. I. E. truck positively fixed the time of
the collision, as did various witnesses (Tr. 325-326). The
ambulance operator, who kept a time log, was called at 8:40
p.m., some 5 minutes after the crash (Tr. 193).
Immediately preceding 8:35p.m., as shown by the automatic recorder in the P. I. E. truck (Plaintiffs' Ex. 16, Tr.
314) and by numerous witnesses, the defendant driver was
operating his heavy equipment southward along Springville
Road at a speed in excess of 50 miles per hour (Tr. 26, 35,
46, 80, 111, 279, 280, 326, 408), with his horn held down
almost constantly (Tr. 31, 35, 44, 51, 79, 395), flashing his
lights on low and high beam (Tr. 261) and he passed the
Roberts car, the Payne car, the Stevenson car and finally
the Holt-Beardall car shortly before the collision in question, causing strong wind and throwing up swirls of snow
which interfered with the vision of the other drivers (Tr.
26, 35, 44, 382, 422). The evidence also shows that as he
made a slight curve in the road shortly before the scene of
the collision, he passed from the center line of the highway
onto his left, or wrong, side and about that time, apparently
lost control of his truck which went into a skid (Tr. 58, 136,
137).
The witnesses, Beardall and Holt, the latter an employee of the State Tax Commission (Tr. 134) were driving
south and were passed by the defendants' truck almost immediately before the collision (Tr. 113, 137). There were
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no cars proceeding south ahead of the Holt-Beardall car
('rr. 113, 135), but there was a ·car corning north toward
them shortly before the truck passed them, which could
have been only the Tuttle car (Tr. 136). Just after the
truck passed the Holt-Beardall car, leaving a swirl of snow
in its wake and interfering with .their vision, there was a
flash up ahead, the electric light wires over the road fell
down and Beardall, the driver, had difficulty in stopping
just short of the wires which were going down across the
road (Tr. 113, 137). Beardall backed his car across the
road to the east (Tr. 114, 137).
Beardall and Holt first saw the truck over on the east
side of the road and a passenger car, later identified as the
Tuttle car, north and farther east from it. There were no
other cars in that vicinity and the Beardall-Holt car was
the first at the scene of the accident. Beardall, on the east
side of the highway, threw his headlights on the wrecked
car, and Hblt and Beardall got out to try to help (Tr. 114,
137). Their car was seen on the east side by a number of
witnesses, and they were identified by others as being there
when they came up (Tr. 36, 37, 97, 423, 424). Shortly after· Holt and Beardall pulled their car over to the east side
of the highway, Mrs. Ellis and Mr. Stevenson drove up to
the wires in a car driven by the latter (Tr. 97, 116). Because they were conscious of another car being ahead of
them ·proceeding south (the Holt-Beardall car), and because there was no other car on the right-hand, or west,
side of the road when they drove up, they concluded that
the car involved in the accident was the car·which had been
in front of them, not noticing at the time the Holt-Beardall
ear over on the east side of the highway (Tr. 92, 107, 409).
They so mentioned their impression to the officer in the
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immediate presence of the truck driver, and on this mistaken impression the defense of the defendants is basedthat the passenger car involved in the crash was going
south (Tr. 240, 241).
The investigating officer based his preliminary investigation on such mistaken impression, but when he had an
opportunity of learning all the facts, he changed his report
to show that the Tuttle car was proceeding north (Tr. 241).
The investigator for the defendant company joined the
driver at the home of the impressionable McPhies (Tr. 306)
who also subscribed to this erroneous impression, and the
truck driver, the MoPhies and the investigator must have
spent some time together. The investigator took statements from various witnesses in his own handwriting in
which he omitted many things which were told him that
appeared favorable to the deceased (Tr. 81, 105, 429, 432).
In the meantime, Tuttle's folks, who knew the direction

in which he was proceeding, and Holt and Beardall, who
knew he was not driving south, were at the hospital. Holt
and Beardall, as soon as Tuttle was identified, left the
scene to notify his wife of the tragedy. It was only after
the investigating officer at the hospital was able to talk to
Holt and Beardall that he obtained the truth as to the direction the Tutt~e car was going, and he then changed his
report to show that it was going north (Tr. 240, 241, 254).
Afterwards, Stevenson also indicated to Mrs. Ellis that
they were mistaken in their impression that the Tuttle car
was the one in front of them going south (Tr. 107.) , and
Mrs. Ellis positively testified that the car in front of them
was about a block ahead, and that her original impression
\Vas erroneous, the Holt-Beardall car being on the east side
of the road (Tr. 97, 108). The testimony of Cornette, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

driver of the defendant vehicle, and that of the McPhies,
who persisted in the fiction based upon Stevenson's eiToneous impression, was so contradictory, unbelievable and contrary to established physical facts, that the jury could not
have given any credence to it.
Since the peculiar facts in the case will dispose of most
of the law arguments of defendants, we take the liberty of
giving further details with specific reference to the record.
The P. I. E. driver had left his home in South Salt Lake
City or Murray, Utah, and driven to the scene of the accident, a distance of 41 miles, in 1 hour and 10 minutes (Tr.
316) . The gross weight of the P. I. E. outfit was between
sixty and sixty-four thousand pounds (Tr. 260). The }(}cation of the accident was 3.7 miles north of Dale Tuttle's
home on the main highway between Springville and Provo
(Tr. 159) and was 1.6 miles south of the semaphore light
at Seventh East and Third South Streets in Provo, Utah
(Tr. 159) which is about 10 blocks from downtown Provo.
The evening of the collision, the P. I. E. truck passed
Charles M. Roberts, one of the witnesses for the plaintiff,
going south, about % of a mile north of the ·collision (Tr.
25). The P. I. E. truck was going at a high rate of speed
(Tr.· 26), was blowing its horn, and Roberts pulled off the
main part of the road into a snow bank; the snow from the
P. I. E. truck covered the windshield and headlights and
Roberts had to get off the highway and wipe off the windshield before he could go on (Tr. 26).
Just prior to the accident, the P. I. E. truck passed
Douglas Payne, another witness for the plaintiffs, who was
delivering papers for The Deseret News. The truck passed
Payne about a block and a half north of "Lou's Place."
Payne heard a loud blast of the horn two or three times
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and the truck came by, going pretty fast and blew snow
and wind inside of the car (Tr. 35). The truck went up
the road with a s\virl of snow following the back of the
truck (Tr. 36). Payne thought the truck was going about
50 miles an hour (Tr. 35). When Payne got to the scene
of the accident, he saw a car parked on the east side of the
road, .facing south, and he parked behind it (Tr. 36, 37).
This car was the Holt-Beardall car.
Dellis Elliott and his brother, Gordon, just before the
collision, were standing on the road about a block north of
"Lou's Place," when after sounding its horn, the P~ I. ·E.
truck passed a car just opposite Dellis, just as the car was
passing (Tr. 45). There were one or two other cars fifty
yards behind the car passed near Dellis Elliott (Tr. 47) .
At the time the truck passed Dellis Elliott, there were no
other cars ahead of the truck (Tr. 51). The truck didn't
honk any more after it passed Dellis Elliott (Tr. 51).
Jean Elliott, the mother of Dellis and Gordon, stated
that her boys were hitchhiking a ride to Springville to go
to the basketball game, and that when she heard a loud
honking, she was afraid about the boy~ being out on the
road too far. She went out on the porch of her home and
saw the truck passing a car near a street light in front of
their place (Tr. 54, 55, 56).
Gordon Elliott, brother of Dellis, testified that when
the truck passed them, it was passing another car (Tr. 56) .
He testified that the truck was traveling in the middle of
the road (Tr. 56), and that the truck was more to the east
of the road when it passed him (Tr. 74); that it was most
east of center (Tr. 74); and when it passed them, it cut
across the bend in the road to the east side (Tr. 75) .
Carol Ellis testified that she was riding in a car with
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C. E. Stevenson the night of the collision and that they
were following another car (Tr. 79). That she heard a
horn blowing somewhere behind them and the truck passed
them in the middle of the road going about 50 or 55 miles
an hour (Tr. 80). After the truck passed them, so testified Mrs. Ellis, it started swaying (Tr. 87). She and Stevenson drove up to the wire which had fallen across the
road and when they arrived at the scene of the accident,
there was another car backed on the opposite (east) side
of the road facing the wreck (Tr. 82). Mrs Ellis testified
that she first thought that the car they had been following
was the car involved in the accident (Tr. 90), but changed
her mind later when she talked to Mr. Stevenson (Tr. 107).
She definitely recalled seeing a car there that night when
they first arrived, but did not know whether it was the one
they had been following, but she did see a car with its headlights on (Tr. 97).
Clifford Beardall, another witness for the plaintiffs,
testified that the night of the accident, he was accompanied
by Ernest L. Holt and was driving in the vicinity of Lou's
Place when the truck passed him (Tr. 110-111) and that
when it passed hin1, the wind caused a movement of his car
(Tr. ·111). He further testified that the truck was over the
center of the highway (Tr. 112). Beardall testified that
there was no car in front of him going south at the time
the truck passed him (Tr. 113). He stopped his car about
eight inches from the wires as they fell down; he immediately backed his car to the east and pulled up until his lights
hit the scene of the accident (Tr. 114). At the time of his
arrival, there was no one at -the scene of the accident and
after observing the person in the wrecked' car, he went to
direct traffic which was then coming both ways (Tr. 116).
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Beardall further testified that he at first didn't recognize the
deceased (Tr. 115) but later learned that it was Dale Tuttle
(Tr. 118), and as soon as Tuttle was put into the ambulance, he went to Springville to notify his family (Tr. 120).
Ernest L. Holt, the passenger in the Beardall car, testified that the only other vehicle in front of them was one
going over the Infirmary Hill towards Springville, where
he could just see its tail lights (Tr. 135). Holt has been
District Auditor of the Provo office of the State Tax Commission for 13 years (Tr. 134). He testified that the truck
passed them near Lou's Place and when it passed them it
was straddling the center line, and as it went on, it went
over further to the east side of the highway (Tr. 136). He
testified that just before the truck passed, there was a car
coming from the south about half-way down the Infirmary
Hill; after the truck passed the Beardall automobile it. went
over into the inside lane of the north-bound traffic- and
after that, there was a flash of light and he saw a wire fall
across the highway and Holt called Beardall's attention to
stop the car (Tr. 137). Hlolt testified that when they arrived at the scene of the accident and backed on the east
of the highway, no one else had arrived at the scene of the
accident (Tr. 136).
Holt further testified that shortly after they got over
to the east side of the highway, the cars started coming
but they had sufficient time to back the Beardali car over
and get the lights on the wreck before any other cars approached (Tr. 136).
Elmer Roberts, a witness for the plaintiffs, who was
called on plaintiffs' rebuttal, testified that he had been
one of the pedestrians accompanying Mr. and -Mrs. McPhie,
witnesses for the defendants, and that when he ran up to
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the scene of the accident, Mr. Beardall was standing out in
the middle of the road, although he didn't recall seeing Mr.
Beardall's automobile backed on the east, but did know
that there was light on the scene of the accident and it
could have been from headlights of a car (Tr. 423 and 424).
Although none of the witnesses for the plaintiffs
claimed to have seen the acual impact, except for the flash
of lights, their testimony was clear and :convincing that
there was no impact on the west side of the highway and
no passenger car driving south where the impact occurred.
Holt saw the car coming from the south to\vard the north
immediately prior to the impact and that was the only car
in that vicinity and could have been none other than the
Tuttle car as there were no other cars there when Holt and
Beardall arrived. It is true that some of the witnesses for
the defendants believed that Stevenson, who was traveling
south, had been following the car in which the deceased was
riding, and that some of the witnesses for the defendants
claimed to have seen the impact, but in examining the testimony of the witnesses who claimed to have seen the impact, it was clearly demonstrated that the collision could
not have happened in the way they testified; that the witnesses were subject to false impressions and the only reasonable conclusion that could be reached by the jury was
that the Tuttle automobile at the time._ of the impact was
proceeding north.
From an examination of plaintiffs' Ex. GG, it will be
seen that the -point at which the Elliott boys were standing
Vt"hen the truck passed them was approximately 1,500 feet
from the point of impact and that Lou's Place was aproximately 1,000 to 1,100 feet from the point of the impact.
The testimony of the Elliott boys, and particularly Dellis
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Elliott, was that there was no other car in front of the car
that the truck passed near the Elliott boys; thus Holt's and
Beardall's testimony was fully corroborated.
II.

STATEMENT OF POINTS

We will follow the general order of treatment specified in appellants' brief, but will present our argument under the three major headings, since it is impractical in many
respects to segregate the material under the sub-headings
set out by appellants. We shall also consider the points
concerning the denial of a directed verdict and the denial
of a new trial under the same heading.
Respondents claim that:
1. Defendants' motion for a directed verdict was properly denied by the courtt as was defendant's motion for a
new trial.
(a) The collision was caused· by the defendants'
own negligence and was not contributed to by the deceased.
(b) The jury found from ample evidence that
the deceased was traveling north, according to the theory of the plaintiffs.
(c) Proximate callS? and all other necessary elements of plaintiffs' case are fully and amply _supported
by the evidence.
/

2. The court's instructions when considered as a
whole, were correct, and fully and correctly set forth the
theories of both plaintiffs and defendants and the law applicable thereto, and no prejudicial error was involved in
any instruction.
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3. Defendants' counsel on cross-examination, himself,
brought out the matter of insurance in response to his own
question., and the mention of insurance was not prejudicial
in any respect.
1.

Defendants' motion for a directed verdict and a new
trial were properly denied.

Counsel for defendants cites numerous cases in
support of the proposition that a motorist proceeding in the
same direction as a car following, who makes a left turn
directly in front of the oncoming motorist, is either solely
negligent or at least contributorily negligent. With this
proposition, we have no quarrel. Both sides of the controversy in this case in the argument, agreed that the material
question and the ultimate fact to be determined by the jury
was whether the decedent, just, prior to the collision
was driving south or was driving north. This question was
submitted to the jury and the jury determined that the decedent was traveling north just prior to the impact; consequently, the cases cited by counsel for the defendants could
have no bearing upon the ultimate decision in this case, and
we submit counsel are merely- trying to cloud the issue here.
Not one case has been cited by the defendants to indicate
that if the deceased were traveling north, recovery should
not be had.We admit now, and we conceded at the trial, that if
the jury found that immediately prior to the collision, the
Tuttle car was proceeding south and turned directly in front
of-the oncoming P. I. E. truck, as claimed by the defend·
ants, the defendants would not be liable. The evidence,
however, abundantly established the opposite.
Defendants' motion for a directed verdict, and motion

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
for a new trial should not have been granted and were properly denied because, even if the evidence did not show beyond all reasonable doubt that the deceased was traveling
north, it did show by a quantum of proof that is convincing
to reasonable men that he was going north. The evidence
further tends to show that the sole defense of the defendants was based upon a mere mistake or fiction.
There is, in fact, no contributory negligence, either
claimed, alleged or proved on the theory that the deceased
\Vas driving north\vard. Every claim of contributory negligence made by defendants is predicated on the fiction that
the deceased was driving south. There being abundant evidence to support the fact that he was going north, and the
jury so having found, there is not even a claim or pleading
of any kind to support appellants' arguments of contributory negligence.
Plaintiffs abundantly established that the deceased
was traveling north at the time of the collision by the des..
tination of the deceased as Provo immediately before the
collision, by the time element as to when he left Spring..
ville, by positive testimony that there was no vehicle going
south in front of the BeardaU..Holt car, and by the positive
testimony of Holt that there was a car approaching the
scene from the south going north immediately prior to the
collision, which could have been only the Tuttle car. The
physical facts themselves effectually negatived any idea
that the Tuttle car, being, when it stopped, considerably
north and east of the tractor and trailer, could have been
going south. No one, moreover, can question that the deceased met his death as a result of the collision with the
P. I. E. truck.
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Defendants say that the verdict should not be based
upon speculative evidence. To that we may agree. But
every necessary fact is established by affirmative evidence.
Certainly, circumstantial evidence is often more convincing than direct.
Where is the assumed or supposed fact in this case
which is not confirmed by proof? ·There is no question but
that the deceased met his death as a result of a collision
\vith the P. I. E. truck. It is positively established that
there were no cars in front of the Beardall-Holt car on the
west side of the street, but that there was a ·car approaching from the south toward the north just before the collision which could have been none other than the Tuttle
car. The fact is abundantly established that defendant
driver was speeding, crossed to the wrong side of the highway, and lost control of his vehicle, which skidded sideways.
There is no question but that the decedent was where
he had a right to be, and that his death was proximately
caused by the negligence of the defendants.
The proximate cause of the decedent's death is not left
to conjecture. In cases cited by defendants in their brief,
the death \Vas caused in one of two ways, there being no
proof as to which- manner was involved. If it were caused
one \Vay, the defendants would have been responsible; if it
were caused another way, the defendants would not have
been responsible. Irt the cases cited by defendants, it could
not be determined in which manner death occurred. Thecourt held that the jury had to determine from a preponderance of the evidence in order to hold the defendant
liable, that the death occurred in the manner for which the
def 2'-ndant \vould be Hable. Of course, if the probabilities
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are equally balanced and there is no evidence tending to
show the fact, then the defendant would prevail. The cases
cited by the defendants are very different from the instant
case. There are no inferences based upon inferences here.
It has been held that in an action for negligently causing the death of a brakeman, plaintiff may rely on physical
facts to show that the train moved while deceased was between the cars, though the conductor testified negatively
that he did not observe it move. Perrin v. Union Pac. R.
R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 Pac. 405; certiorari denied, 42 S. Ct.
270, 257 u. s. 661.
If there is evidence from which jury, as reasonable

men, can find the existence of a disputed fact, it is not
"speculation" simply because there is equally strong evidence from which they could have arrived at an opposite
conclusion. Coray v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 111
Utah 541, 180 P.2d 532.
The fact finder is not always required to believe the

uncontradicted testimony of a witness. Gagos v. Industrial
Commission, 87 Utah 101, 48 P.2d 449; rev. 87 Utah 92, 39
P.2d 697.
Although the trier of facts in determining where truth
lies must not arbitrarily, capriciously nor without adequate
reason reject testimony, he should not accept testimony
.founded in ignorance, confusion, mistake, bias, preJudice or
falsehood merely because no other witness testified conversely. Jensen v. Logan City, 96 Utah 522, 88 P.2d 549;
a.ffirming 96 Utah 53, 83 P.2d 311.
· For purpose of supporting judgment, it is immaterial
from which side the evidence comes. Haycraft v. Adams,
82 Utah 347, 24 P.2d 1110.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
Where plaintiff's witness and .defendants' witness· give
conflicting testimony, a jury is entitled to believe the testimony of plaintiff's witness. Schlatter v. McCarthy, _ __
Utah
, 196 P.2d 968; rehearing denied, 198 P.2d 473.
Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224.
It has further been said that testimony contrary to
uncontroverted physical facts is not substantial evidence.
Hearstrich v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 70 Utah 552,
262 Pac. 100 .
While a jury cannot arbitrarily reject testimony, it
need not accept it when it is rendered improbable or doubtful by circumstances. Leavitt v. Thurston, 38 Utah 351,
113 Pac. 77.
The whole defense of the defendants that the deceased
\vas going south was originally predicated on a misunderstanding. It was not explained and never could be explained
by defendants or their counsel why in the limited time between the time Dale Tuttle left his home and the scene of
of the crash he would, or could, drive to, ar toward Provo,
then make a 180-degree turn back toward Springville, and
then with this huge tractor and trailer, lights flashing and
horn blowing, bearing do\vn upon him, suddenly make another 180-degree turn directly into the path of the truck.
It was never explained how the light touring car of Tuttle,
if it were traveling south and turned in front of a truck
going 50 miles an hour or better, cotdd end up almost immcdia tely east of the claiined point of impact, on the extreme east side of the· road, ·while the truck ended up considerably to the south. Had the accident happened as defendants claimed, it is apparent that the lighter car would
h3.ve been knocked farther south and to the \vest of the
road, while it is natural that Tuttle, traveling north, and
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trying to turn to the right to avoid the careening truck on
the east side of the road, slid into such truck sideways, being pushed off farther north from where the truck stopped.
One has but to examine the conflicting testimony of
the driver Cornette to see why the jury could not believe
him or the other witnesses for the defendants. At the hearing, Cornette testified , that he noticed that the first car
which he passed was a light one and the second one was
dark, and positively had a recollection of that before the
impact (Tr. 287), but he admitted on cross-examination
that he had testified at the time of the taking of his deposition sometime previous to the trial that he did not notice
the color of the cars at all but just noticed there were cars,
and admitted that he had testified that his observation of
the Tuttle car was based on what he had seen after the accident (Tr. 301).
At the trial, Cornette testified that he didn't try to
turn "in no direction" at the time of the accident but admitted that he had given a statement to the company that
he applied his brake as fast as possible and that he attempted to turn to the right to avoid the other car (Tr.., 304).
In reading the record, and particularly the testimony
of Cornette, one cannot but feel that he was not telling the
truth and in view of his testimony and the testimony of Mr.
and Mrs. McPhie, setting forth occurrences that were impossible because of the physical facts, the jury concluded,
and rightly, that prior· to the impact, the Tuttle car was
going north, and returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for damages, the amount of which is not complained
of by plaintiffs.
We ask the Court to carefully read the record and examine the exhibits: the pictures taken by the police officer
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that night, giving some indication of the bitter, cold and
slippery conditions prevailing, and the huge equipment
which the defendant driver was so recklessly operating; the
speed recorder of the truck showing that at the time of the
impact the truck was exceeding 50 miles per hour, which
may have been all right for a dry, sunny day,.but by virtue
of the very nature of the conditions existing that night was
highly reckless under the ·circumstances; the pictures showing the pole near which the Tuttle vehicle stopped and the
type of roadway involved; the map showing the distance
farther north where the defendants' vehicle came. to rest;
the officer's report showing how he first fixed the direction
of travel of the Tuttle car on the mistaken impression of
Stevenson, but showing later how he changed the direction
"south" to "north" after he had had an opportunity of talking to Beardall and Holt at the hospital and completing his
investigation; the statements of witnesses taken. by the defendants' investigator in his own handwriting in which he
left out anything that would be favorable to plaintiffs, as
show~ by Holt, Beardall, Ellis and Roberts.
We ask the Court to consider that these statements
were taken, beginning first at the McPhie residence where
the truck driver stayed with the investigator until the early
hours of the morning. We ask the Court to consider how,
if the truck going more than 50 miles an hour, hit tbe Tuttle
car as it wag, proceeding in the same direction and suddenly
turned in front, it could, under any stretch of the imagination, shoot as almost a right angle over to the extreme east
side of the highway, while the truck ended up a considerable
distance to the south and not as far east.
We ask the Court to consider the .admitted fact that
the: defendants' driver could not identify even the color of
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the Tuttle car, basing his knowledge only on what he saw
after the car came to rest. If the physical facts themselves,
as shown by the exhibits, are considered, we believe that
the defendants' version must be considered impossible. An
analysis of all the evidence shows that it was impossible.
Counsel for the defendants, both in opening statement
to the jury and in argument, admitted that the controlling
issue. and the one which would ultimately determine the
case, was the direction in \vhich the deceased was going
just prior to the impact. We reiterated counsel's statement.
The jury determined that the deceased was going north.
Now, counsel should not be heard to complain that the jury
decided on the evidence against his contention. . The question should be, and is, the ultimate and final determination.
The case of Larkey v. Church (Okla) 192 Pac. 569,
cited by defendants, is interesting, and the headnote sets
forth pretty well the holding:
''The act of driving an automobile on the wrong
side of the street, in violation of a city ordinance, at the
time when an accident by collision occurs, is of itself
prima facie evidence of negligence. However, that
presumption of negligence may be overcome by proof;
but the burden is upon the party so wrongfully using
the streets to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the fact that he was driving on the wrong side of
the street was not the proximate cause of the collision."
In the instant case, the record is replete with evidence
that the defendant Heath Cornette was on the wrong side
of the road at the time of, and just before, the impact. The
jury believed that the deceased was at the time traveling
north. There was no evidence to show contributory negligence on the part of the deceased-no evidence to show
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that the negligence of the defendant, ·Heath Cornette, was
not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' damage if the
jury should adopt plaintiffs' theory, which it did. All evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom are resolved
most favorably to plaintiff as against a motion for a directed
verdict. Roach v. Kyremes,
Utah
, 211 P.2d
181.
The trial court which heard the case denied defendants' motion for a new trial, obviously feeling that justice
had been done, as indeed it has been. The court's action
should not be disturbed on appeal. Valiotis v. Utah-Apex
Mining Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 Pac. 802. Moser v. Zion's
Co-op Mercantile Institution,
Utah
, 197 P.2d
136.

2.

The court did not err in instructing the jury.

We first present our position in summary.
The theories of the parties were fairly and fully presented to the jury and the question resolved itself into the
jury's determination of whether the Tuttle car was going
north or south. There was no possibility of confusion or
prejudice. Any technical objections which defendants have
raised could not have been prejudicial in any respect.
The court did not err in giving instruction No. 13, and
the jury could have been in no way misled by such instruction.
Instructions numbered 14 and 15 must be read in the
light of other instructions and in that connection were correct. In no way could they have been prejudicial.
Defendants' requested instructions Nos. 16 and 17 were
properly refused, since they were merely repetitious and
the court in its instruction No. 4 gave instructions even

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
more favorable to the defendants, instructing the jury in
effect that if the deceased were going south and turned in
front of the defendants' truck, there could be no recovery
in any event, no matter what the speed or manner of operation of the truck were. Also in instruction No. 11, the
same matter was covered in a form more favorable to the
defendants. In fact, the defendants secured instructions
from the court amounting in effect to the instruction that
if the deceased was driving southward, there could be no
recovery in any event.
The court did not err in its instructions Nos. 6 and 9,
such instructions being correct statements both standing
alone and in view of other instructions; in fact, instruction
No. 6 was unduly favorable to the defendants as it told the
jury that if they found that the deceased was guilty of any
acts of negligence pled by defendants proximately contributing to the accident, they should return "No cause of action". Defendants' requests Nos. 7 and 9 were properly rejected. Insofar as they were proper, they were covered by
other instructions.
The court did not err in giving instruction No. 1. This
instruction merely recited the various allegations of the
parties and clearly stated that such allegations were denied
by the opposing parties. There were no allegations recited
concerning the conduct of the defendants of which there
was not adequate evidence. On the other hand, some allegations were recited in that instruction as against plaintiffs
upon which there was no evidence, such as the deceased's
claimed "failing to slow down or turn out to avoid the collision." However, in view of the instructions of the court
clearly defining the controlling issue and presenting the
theory of each party, there was, and could be, no prejudice.
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Any abstract instructions given by the court were
proper statements of the law and were in no way misleading, confusing or prejudicial. They were as favorable to
the defendants as to the plaintiff, and probably more so,
and in view of other instructions could not have prejudiced
the defendants in any way. The defendants' requests which
appellants argue should have been given were merely repetitious and, in most cases, were biased and argumentative
reiterations of the single theory of the defendants, that the
deceased was going south. They prefixed the instruction
of the court to the effect that in any event if the decedent
was going south and turned in front of the truck, there
could be no recovery with a lot of arguments as to why the
turning in front of the truck would bar recovery, and the
requests were unnecessary and improper.
Counsel for defendants object to the language in instruction No. 13 of the court and particularly "included in
this duty to use due care and diligence is the duty to constantly keep a lookout not only ahead but to the sides of
his vehicle." They refer to the case of Morrison v. Perry,
104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772. Even in that case, the court
felt that under some circumstances, there would be required
a constant lookout. The court, in view of the dangerous
conditions of the road, as brought out by the evidence, could
well instruct as a matter of law that there was required a
constant lookout. In any event, in ,considering the instruction as a whole, there could be no prejudice to the defendants, for if the jury found the deceased was going south, it
was instructed to find in effect for defendants, and if north,
the .instruction \vas wholly immaterial as the truck would
be on the wrong side of the road.
The court did not· instruct that the defendant driver

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
should keep a constant lookout in "every direction" as
stated by counsel for the defendants, but''. . . not only
ahead, but to the sides of his vehicle.'' That language must
be given a reasonable construction.
In the instant case, the court qualified his instruction
and provided that the defendants would not be liable if the
other person were negligent and his negligence proximately
contributed to the injury.
Instruction No. 14, to which objection is made by the
defendants, only required that the defendant driver must
maintain reasonable control over his automobile and take
such measures as are reasonable to stop or tum to avoid
a collision with other vehicles. This is no more than the
law requires. The Affleck case cited by the defendants
\Vent much further and could be interpreted by a jury to
state that there was an absolute duty as in insuror, to avoid
injuring anyone or colliding with any person on the highway.

Taking instruction No. 15 as a whole, it cannot be seen
how it could be in any way prejudicial, particularly in view
of the fact that the jury obviously adopted plaintiffs' theory
that the decedent was going north at the time of the impact
and that the defendant Cornette was driving on the east
and \Vrong side of the road. Defendants object to No. 15 on
the claim that there was no evidence that defendant's speed
was a proximate cause of the collision. Certainly the jury
was instructed to find on the question of proximate cause
in instruction No. 7 and the record was full of evidence of
the tremendous speed of the defendant Cornette under the
circumstances. If ever. there was a clear case of speed as
one of the proximate causes, this is it. The speed was not
disputed. There was evidence that the truck of the defend~--

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24.

ants started to skid prior to the impact and there was nothing to explain such skidding except speed.
· The court's instruction No. 6, taken as a whole, together with the other instructions, covered the situation
correctly, we believe, under the facts. If the jury believed
that the deceased was going north, as they did, there would
be no eye-witnesses as to any contributory negligence on
the part of the deceased and he would be presumed free
from negligence.
The sum and substance of the matter as to the direction in which the deceased was traveling immediately prior
to the impact was presented to the jury, and was determined, and such issue was so clear and determinative that
any technical error should not be deemed prejudicial. In
any event, the court did not instruct the jury that the presumption in favor of due care by the deceased was evidence,
and correctly instructed the jury that the burden was on
the defendants to show contributory negligence on the part
of the deceased and that only in the absence of evidence,
did such presumption prevail. There could have been, and
was, no prejudicial error in this respect.
The instructions of the court left no room for misunderstanding. The theories of the respective parties were
clearly and expressly stated.. In its last analysis, the primary complaint of the appellants is that the jury did not
believe their theory. We say that their theory cannot be
believed in view of the ·contrary physical facts in evidence,
the time element, the testimony of Hlolt and Beardall, which
remained unimpeached, and all the other surrounding facts
which, when analyzed, were consistent only with plaintiffs'
theory.
In final analysis, even though the deceased may have
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had time, which he did not, to drive past the scene of the
accident bound for Provo, then turn around without stopping in Provo, and then just as this big tractor and trailer,
with horn blowing and lights alternately on high and low
beam, bore down upon him, turn around again without any
discernable reason right into its path, the theory is fantastic in and of itself. But be that as it may, at the very least
there was a conflict of testimony as to the direction the
Tuttle car was going, which was the whole crux of the case,
and the court very clearly and properly submitted that controlling question to the jury from the standpoints of the
respeetive parties as follo\VS:
"No. 3. You are instructed that plaintiffs' contention is that at the time of the accident, the deceased,
Dale Tuttle, was driving an automobile north on the
highway at the time and place of the accident, and that
the defendant, Heath H. c·omette, was driving defendants' truck south upon said highway in th~ opposite
direction, and that plaintiffs further claim that the de-:
fendant Cornette carelessly and negligently turned and
drove defendants' truck across the center line, and
thereby proximately causing the collisionr
"If you find by a preponderanc of the evidence
that the defendants were negligent as claimed by the
plaintiffs, the accident having occurred as claimed by
the plaintiffs and that such negligence of the defendants, if any, was the proximate cause of the death of
Dale Tuttle, and if you further find from the evidence
that the said Dale Tuttle exercised reasonable care for
his own safety and was not himself guilty of negligence
contributing to. his death, then you are instructed that
it will be your duty to return a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants in this action for
damages to be fixed and assessed by you in accordance
with instructions as herein given.
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by not considering any other instruction, that an argument
can be made against it.
Defendants' requests on the question of presumption
would have the jury believe that since McPhie claimed to
be an eye-witness, they would in no event consider any presumption of due care, even though the jury believed that
McPhie did not see the collision. The court in such event
would be instructing the jury that they were bound to believe McPhie at all events, even as against the testimony
of Roberts· and the other evidence showing that he could
not have seen what he claimed.
It was for the jury to say whether there was any credible evidence establishing the fact, and to adopt defendants'
requests would have been to usurp the province of the jury
and practically direct a verdict for defendants. What the
court said was a correct statement of the law and the only
proper way to leave the matter with the jury. Had the
jury believed McPhie's evidence, the court had already instructed the jury that plaintiffs could not have recovered
if the deceased were going south. In view of that, and the
other instructions of the court, there was no possibility that
the jury could have been misled.
There was evidence to show (a) that defendant at the
time of the impact was going approximately 52 miles an
hour; (b) that the driver lost control of the truck prior to
the impact; (c) that when passing other cars, defendant
flashed his lights from high beam to lowbeam and again on
high beam, which in connection with his other actions was
calculated to ··confuse other drivers; (d) that driving conditions were especially bad that night and that the defendant driver operated the truck recklessly under the condi-
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side of the road.
The jury could well find that all of these acts contributed to the death of Dale Tuttle. There was ample· evidence
to support all of the allegations in the complaint. Cotmsel
certainly by no
for defendants assert that ".
stretch of the imagination were lights a proximate cause of
the collision." With this statement we do not agree. Evidence was submitted that the defendant Cornette cut his
truck across the curve; the lights of the truck would have
been directly on the oncoming traffic. The flashing of the
lights onto high beam, as was testified to, would have blinded the eyes of Dale Tuttle, and this cause, together with
other causes about which evidence was introduced, proxi~
mately caused the death of Dale Tuttle. There is no question that there is, and was, ample evidence to support all
of the allegations of negligence set forth in the complaint.·
All reasonable men must agree that to pass other cars
at a high speed, against oncoming traffic, with lights flash~
ing on high and low beam, would be likely to cause an accident and would not be due care. It is a complete answer
that if Dale Tuttle were going north, the defendants do not
even claim they would not be liable. There could be no possible prejudice· to the instructions complained of, since the
direction in which the Tuttle car was proceeding fixed the
liability under the peculiar circumstances of this case.
We-call attention to Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to the effect that no error is ground for granting a
new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment unless refusal
to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with
substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceedings must disregard any error or defect which does not
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affect the substantial rights of the parties. This sound principle was recognized under the statutes on procedure prior
to the rule cited. 104-14-7 and 104-39-3, U. C. A. 1943.
In the case of Fowler v. Medical Arts Building, 112
Utah 367, 188 P.2d 711, the prevailing opinion, after admitting that at least one issue was submitted to the jury on
which there was no evidence and conceding that the instructions which involved a mere repetition of ambiguous pleadings were erroneous, held that in view of the circumstances ·
in the issues before the jury, the jury could not have been
misled and the judgment was sustained.
In the case at bar, the court did not fall into the error
mentioned .in the Fowler case, except in a manner favorable
to defendants. Even in instruction No. 1, the court mentioned no facts claimed by plaintiffs on which there was no
evidence. The conflict between the respective theories was
made clear and it was also clear that if the jury found that
the deceased was going north it would return a verdict for
the plaintiff, and if going south, for the defendants. No confus.ion or mistake could have resulted.
· Abstract instructions ordinarily do not constitute reversible error. See Section 121, p. 347, "Abstract instructions in civil cases," Reid's Bransons Instructions to Juries,
Vol. 1, 3rd Ed., "An abstract proposition having no application to tpe issues before the jury should not be given as
an instruction, though correct in principle, for its tendency
is to confuse and mislead but such an instruction will not
ordinarily warrant a reversal unless the instruction has mis..
led the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party."
The claimed abstract instructions here did have application
to the issues. There could have been no prejudice.
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On the other hand, it is settled that a trial court's refusal to give requested instructions in a personal injury action is not error where the substance of those requests is
embodied in the court's instructions. Moser v. Zion's Co-op.
Mercantile Institution,
Utah
, 197 P.2d 136·.
Skeen v. Peterson,
Utah
, 196 P.2d 708.
The case of Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah 366, 270
Pae. 348, is referred to by defendants in support of their
argument that prejudice \Viii be presumed. In the Jensen
case, \Vhich involved a number of basic errors which vitally
affected the shady line behveen uncertain fact situations,
there was no question but that the errors were such as to
affect the outcome. In our case, we do not believe that
there was any substantial error for the reasons stated in
this brief. It furthermore appears ·clear that if there were
any errors committed, they could not have affected the result of the case.
If the jury had found the deceased was traveling south
there could have been, under the instructions, nothing but
a "no cause of action" verdict; if north, not even the defendants contend that the verdict could have been in their
favor. The entire brief of defendants is based on the assumption that the jury had to find that the deceased was ·
traveling south. The facts show that he was not so traveling, and the defendants' real complaint is that the jury did
not agree with defendants on this point. Had the jury
f6Ulld the deceased was traveling south, there could have
been no other result under the instructions than a verdict
for defendants, and the court in substance so instructed the .
jury.

Whichever view the jury took on direction; substantially determined the outcome. Any super-technical or mic-
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roscopic examination of the instructions indulged in by defendants we believe comes well within the comment of the
Utah Court in its de<:ision on the re-hearing in. the Jensen
case, supra, (p. 362).
''We think the better rule is that not all committed
errors in the trial of a case are presumptively or prima
facie prejudicial for some committed errors are merely
abstract, or on their face immaterial, or otherwise are
not in and of themselves calculated to do harm."
8.

Plaintiffs' counsel did not wrongfully or otherwise inject insurance indemnification into the case.

The fact is that on cross-examination of an opposing
witness, counsel for the defendants, himself, first brought
out the question of insurance. Any mention was occasioned
by .defendants. Plaintiffs' counsel carefully avoided any reference to insurance or any questions designed to produce
any mention. Interrogatories on insurance were even avoided by plaintiff on voir dire.
The fact that the corporate defendant was a great company with whom all were familiar would make it unlikely
that the question ·of insurance could make any. difference
anyway. The jury was properly instructed· to disregard
any mention of insurance by the witness Ellis, so originated
by defendants' own counsel on cross-examination.
In the instant case, after the question by counsel for
defendants on cross-examination which first brought out
the mention of insurance as quoted on page 61 of plaintiffs'
brief, it is true that plaintiffs' counsel examined Mrs. Ellis
and that she answered as quoted in plaintiff's brief. However, there was nothing in the context of the questions of
plaintiffs' counsel which would enable him to anticipate
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that there \Vould be a further reference to insurance. We
quote the questions leading up to the last reference:
"Q.

About how long did Mr. Kunz talk to you, Mrs.

Ellis?
A. Oh, it was quite some time.
Q. Talk to you more than once?
A. No, he didn't. Just the once.
Q. Where were you working at the time?
A. I was working at Provo Clinical Laboratory.
Q. \Vhat were you doing there?
A. Assisting Mr. Creer with book work, and clinical.
Q. Was this during office hours?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. What did he say to you?''
Plaintiffs' counsel never referred to Mr. Kunz as an insurance adjuster, as intimated by defendants' counsel, and
any mention of insurance was a surprise to both counselcertainly ~o plaintiffs'. Mrs. Ellis, previously to the time
mentioned by counsel for the defendants, had testified that
she had not talked to the police officer who had come down
to the scene of the accident (Tr. 88) and then, as counsel
stated, the questions were asked which gave rise to the alleged objectionable statement with respect to an insurance
investigator (Tr. 90). In examining the record, we cannot
even now, ascertain to whom counsel referred when he
asked, "Who did you make that statement to?" There had
been a lot of questions asked between the time that counsel
had been talking about the police officer and the time that
he asked his question. The answer was no fault of the
plaintiffs nor of their counsel; it came as much of a surprise
to plaintiffs as to defendants. There was no intent on the
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part of plaintiffs or counsel that such a statement should be
made, nor any knowledge thereof. The case of Morrison
v. 'Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772, cited by defendants
herein was very much different. The court in this case
stated on page 779, para. 17:
"It is apparent the only purpose for such persistent
questioning was to tell the jury that defendant was insured. From the record it appears that plaintiff's counsel knew that Mr. Williams was employed by the insurance company and consequently he could anticipate
the witness' answer. We need not cite authority for
the proposition that the question of indemnity insurance in a. case such as this is irrelevant. It is also a
well known fact that juries are influenced in determining liability and the amount of recovery by the fact
that an insurance company w9uld pay the damages.
·By this we do not say that in some cases a referenca
to insurance is not proper.''
In the Morrison case, the fact was apparent that the
questioning was for the apparent purpose of getting the
matter of insurance before the jury. · No such thing existed
in this case. In fact, defendants' contention is somewhat
far-fetched when you come right down to it, because de-fendants' O'Wll question brought the reference out. Moreover, the jury was properly instructed to disregard the reference. We also have the fact that the defendant, being a
huge interstate transport company, could hardly have been
prejudiced by the mention of insurance.
The whole essence of all the cases cited by the defendants in connection with this matter, including the Arizona
case of Consolidated Motors, Inc. v. Ketcham, 66 P.2d 246,
hinges on the matter of intention and design to bring out
the matter of insurance-. It would be a peculiar commen-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
tary, if the defendants in this case, when the case has gone
against them, after they, unintentionally or otherwise,
brought out the matter of insurance, could successfully
assert that their O\vn mention of insurance by a witness
was reversible error.
The case of Poland v. Dunbar (Maine) 157 Atl. 381,
cited by defendants, emphasized this view as to the intent
and design to bring out the matter of insurance. In reading the cases cited by defendants, it may be seen that in all
of them there has been such design and intent to bring out
the matter of the insurance. That is the thing that is condemned by the courts. In addition, in the Tuttle case at
bar, the matter was ordered stricken from the record by
the court. The cases examined, for the most part, treat
situations where the plaintiff's counsel elicits the answers.
Here, there could be no question of prejudice anyway, for
the P. I. E. corporation, as the jury well knew, and as
pointed out above, was financially responsible for any verdict.

In the case of Hankins v. Hall (Okla) 54 P.2d 609,
cited by defendants, the determintaive question seemed to
be the matter of whether or not the plaintiff was responsible
therefor.
In 56 ALR 1418, and following, there is an annotation
covering the matter. On page 1451, the rule is stated as
follows:
"Obviously, information volunteered by a witness
to the effect that the defendant carries liability insurance is as harmful and prejudicial as responsive testimony to that effect, and should be promptly stricken
out, yet, as a general· rule, the admission of voluntary
unresponsive statements of this kind are not regarded
as reversible error, even when made by the plaintiff or
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his witnesses, if the court takes prompt action to eradicate such statements, although if the plaintiff himself
makes such statement after admonition by the court,
there is reversible error, and some cases hold that the
mere statements by the plaintiff that defendant car..
ries liability insurance is reversible error."
In the Tuttle case, there was a mere voluntary statement of a witness, initially brought out by the defendants
themselves on cross-examination, as to an insurance man.
On pages 1488-9 of the last mentioned annotation, there
appears the follownig statement:
"Many courts take the position that if the fact
that the defendant is insured, or facts leading to the
inference that he is insured, ·come out naturally as an
incident to a lawful inquiry without a wilful attempt
to bring in this incompetent evidence, no reversible
error occurs, even though they are not strictly relevant or competent. And this would seem a most rea-sonable and just view to take of the matter; but a few
courts go to the extreme of holding that the mere mention of insurance in the course of a trial is so prejudicial as to require a reversal (which the note refers to
as including Oklahoma from which jurisdiction counsel
for defendants have referred to cases) even where offered to discredit a witness, the theory being that,
while this evidence may be logically relevant, it is inadmissible because it will result in confusion of issues
of undue prejudice. But, as said by the. Te~as Court
of Appeals, if any court has held that the mere mention
of an insurance company in a personal injury or death
case is sufficient to reverse the judgment, whether or
not such mention had any effect on the case, it is best
not to follow it, and to return to the domain of common
sense and reason.''
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To the same effect are the annotations in 74 ALR 849,
95 ALR 388 and 105 A~ 1088. In the annotation in 95
ALR 388, at page 393, reference is made to the case of Allen v. Tatum, 11 N. J. Mis. R. 666, 167 A. 668, in which it
was held that a denial of a mistrial was proper after a witness for plaintiff had said, when asked upon cross-examination why he had made a certain statement, "Just to get
rid of the insurance man, I guess", plaintiff having. made
no attempt to benefit by such mention of insurance and the
trial court having charged the jury to disregard it.
Of particular note here is the case Balle v. Smith, 81

Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224, cited in the annotation 95 ALR 388;
in that certain case the court said (P. 231) referring to a
statement that the defendant \vas covered by insurance:

"Whether the making of such remark is such misconduct as required a reversal depends upon the facts
and circumstances of the case, and particularly upon
whether it was made for the purpose of injecting the
subject of defendant's indemnity to prejudice the jury."
We call attention to the following cases as mentiened
in the annotation in 105 ALR 1324:
"Plaintiff's voluntary reply to a question asked by
defendant's counsel as to whether she had signed a
statement, that she signed on for defendant's insurance
man, having come naturally to a question that was not
directed to any specific statement, was held not objectionable, and her later similar reply on redirect examination by her own counsel was held competent to
show the circumstances under which a particular statement was made, the situation having been invited by
defendant, in Kaley v. HJuntley (1935).
App.
_ _ , 88 s. w. 2d 200.
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"A plaintiff's testimony, when cross-examined by
defendant's attorney, that the latter had stated that he
could not take plaintiff's case because the insurance
company had offered to employ him in the case, was
said to have been clearly invited, and any error from
its introduction was held cured by the court's instruction to disregard it, in Clark v. Patterson (1935) 190
Ark. 148, 77 S. W. 2d 978 (master and servant case).
"And the fact that the suggestion of insurance was
first brought out upon defendant's cross-examination
of plaintiff, in explaining how he happened to sign a
statement at the request of a man who said he represented an insurance company, was held to render in. nocuous a later question to plaintiff, by his own coun,.
sel, asking whether the man said that he was an insurance adjuster, and also unanticipated testimony of
another witness as to defendant having said that he
carried insurance, the jury having been instructed to
disregard such question and testimony, in Raymond
v. Sternberger (1935) 116 P. Super. Ct. 451, 176 A.
787._''
There seems no possible merit in defendants' contention.
CONCLUSION
Appellants' entire case is predicated on the_ ~iction that
Stevenson followed the Tuttle car, when in fact, he was following the Holt-Beardall car. Laboring under the erroneous assumption, Stevenson commented at the scene of the
wreck that he had followed the car involved in the collision,
which comment was seized up by the truck driver as an
"out" from an entirely hopeless situation. The impressions of the witnesses McPhies were predicated upOn such
fiction. The investigators for the trucking company who
spent considerable time with the driver and McPhies had
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this fiction in n1ind, \Vhile the Tuttles and Holt and Beardall, who knew the direction Dale Tuttle was traveling, were
locating Tuttle's people and at the hospital. The officer,
who at first talked only to the truck driver and thus with
this mistaken impression in mind, originally reported in accordance therewith, but \Vhen he heard both viewpoints,
changed his report to show the fact that the deceased was
traveling north. The theory of the appellants is a physical in1possibility, for if the vehicles had been traveling in
the same direction, the lighter vehicle, hit broadside, would
have been knocked farther to the south and to the right,
whereas in fact, it stopped considerably north of the truck.
The markings on the highway show that the Tuttle car
\Vas going north, since the scuffing on the road was about
at right angles to where the Tuttle car came to rest.
The time element and the proved intentions and destination of the deceased, confirm this.. The testimony of
Beardall and Holt, as corroborated by numerous other witnesses, including Mrs. Ellis, who rode with Mr. Stevenson,
shows clearly that the Holt-Beardall car was in head of the
Stevenson car and that when the collision occurred, the
Holt-Beardall car immediately backed over to the east of
the road and parked; whereas Stevenson, who came up later, stopped on the west side, saw no car in front of him on
the west and assumed that the car he had been following
was involved. The testimony is positive that there was no
car on the west side of the road, but a car was approaching
on the east side of the road ,coming north, which could have
been only the Tuttle car. There is no question but that
Tuttle met his death in the collision and that the defendant
vehicle was on the-wrong side of- the road and out of con-trol at the time and prior thereto.
The defendants cannot deny that defendants' driver
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was grossly negligent. His negligence was. calculated to,
and did, cause death in view of the hazards existing at the
time. The plaintiff's widow and her infant child were deprived of their husband and father by such negligence.
They are entitled to recover.
The entire defense was based upon the fiction that the
deceased was traveling south. The arguments on appeal in
defendants' brief are premised on the assumption that the
deceased was going south, and his numerous cases principally relate to negligence under such circumstances, the law
of which we do not dispute and never have disputed. Not
one case is cited, nor argument advanced by defendants in
their brief indicating that if the deceased were traveling
north, there should be no recovery. No argument can be
so advanced. The case has already been tried twice at a
great burden to all parties, but particularly to the widow.
No claim is made that the judgment is excessive.
Because of abundant evidence, fully establishing all
necessary elements of plaintiffs' case, the defendants' motions for a directed verdict and for a new trial were properly
denied.
The court did not commit prejudicial error in its instructions, and the issues were fairly presented to the jury.
No prejudicial or any errer was committed in connection with insurance.
judgment is a just and proper one. It should be
affirmed with costs to respondents.
Respectfully submitted,
A. H. CHRISTENSON
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents.
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